Anyone buying or building clinical software for the NHS in England will meet two information standards: DCB0129 and DCB0160. They are short documents with long consequences. This is a plain-English guide to what they require, who they apply to and what is changing — written from the point of view of a developer that intends to meet DCB0129.

Two standards, two roles

DCB0129 applies to the manufacturer of a health IT system. It requires the manufacturer to run a clinical risk management process across the product's life, and to document it: a clinical risk management file and plan, a hazard log, a clinical safety case, and clinical safety case reports for each release, made available to the organisations that deploy the system.

DCB0160 applies to the deploying organisation — a trust, an ICB or a GP practice. It covers the risks of deploying and using the system in that setting: local configuration, training, workflows, and how the system fits alongside others. The deploying organisation relies on the manufacturer's safety case report, but cannot simply adopt it; it must assess its own use.

Both standards require a Clinical Safety Officer: a suitably qualified and experienced clinician with current professional registration, who approves the key documents.

What a hazard log actually contains

A hazard log is the working heart of the process. For each hazard it records the cause, the potential effect on patients, the controls in place, the evidence that those controls work, and the residual risk after controls. For AI-assisted software, hazards include incomplete or incorrect extraction, misplaced trust in fluent output, and changes in behaviour when a model or prompt changes.

The value of a hazard log is not the document but the discipline: every design decision that could affect patients is considered as a safety decision, and the evidence is kept.

The legal basis is shifting

Both standards are published under section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. That section has recently been amended — by the Health and Care Act 2022, with the change in force from July 2025, and by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, in force from February 2026 — giving NHS England stronger powers over how information standards apply, including to IT providers.

NHS England has also been reviewing DCB0129 and DCB0160 themselves. A public consultation ran from June to September 2026. The direction described during the review includes keeping mandatory requirements, moving towards a risk-based, tiered approach, covering AI explicitly, and strengthening monitoring after deployment. At the time of writing, the outcome has not been published.

Related assurance

Clinical risk management sits alongside other assurance. The Digital Technology Assessment Criteria (DTAC), now at version 2.0, cover clinical safety, data protection, technical security, interoperability, and usability and accessibility. Organisations with access to NHS patient data must complete the Data Security and Protection Toolkit. For integration with GP clinical systems, IM1 pairing requires a DCB0129 safety case and hazard log as evidence — and NHS England states that IM1 does not include AI-specific technical assurance, which the supplier must carry itself.

Where Reedley stands

We publish this plainly because buyers should be able to check it. Reedley has an engineering draft of a hazard log and a safety-case outline, maintained alongside the build. No Clinical Safety Officer has been appointed, so none has reviewed them; they are not a safety case, and we do not claim DCB0129 compliance. Appointing a Clinical Safety Officer and establishing the clinical risk management file are prerequisites for any use with real patient data.

This article is general information about UK primary care. It is not clinical, legal or regulatory advice. Figures are taken from the cited sources and are not Reedley results.